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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
\VILLL\.1\I H. STEELE and 
~lEL \'" 1\ R. STEELE, 
PI ai n tiffs-Appellants~ 
vs. 
Case No. 
DEN\'"ER & RIO GRANDE \VEST- 10063 
EH~ IL\ILROAD COMPANY 
and \\'"EYHER CONSTRUCTION 
CO~IPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents~ 
and Cross Appellant. 
Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellant 
ST ... \TE)LEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants 
for damages as the result of injuries received by each 
of them when the pickup truck in which they were rid-
ing was struck by a train owned and operated by the 
defendant Denyer & Rio Grande \Vestern Railroad 
Company. Defendant \Yeyher Construction Company 
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was constructing a concrete overpass at the scene of the 
accident. The plaintiffs alleges that Weyher Construc-
tion Company was negligent in constructing an access 
way to the railroad tracks where the overpass was being 
constructed. This access way was used to gain access to 
the railroad switch terminals located nearby and also 
to move equipment of defendant W eyher Construction 
Company so that the concrete overpass could be con-
structed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendants filed motions for summary judg-
ment supported by affidavits, photographic exhibits, 
and the depositions of the plaintiffs showing that at the 
time the accident occurred, the plaintiffs were aware 
of the railroad crossing and yet drove upon the tracks 
and stopped their pickup truck directly in the path 
of an oncoming train that was so near to the pickup 
truck that it could not stop in time to avoid the col-
lision. ( R. 60) . The rna tter was argued to the lower 
court at the pre-trial conference, the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett presiding. Plaintiffs offered no counter affidavits 
or other evidence in opposition to defendants' motions. 
The trial court granted summary judgment against 
plaintiff William H. Steele as to both defendants and 
against Melva R. Steele as to defendant W eyher Con-
struction Company but denied the railroad's motion for 
summary judgment against Melva R. Steele. (R. 66). 
The court then entered a pre-trial order setting forth 
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the sole issue bet \\Ten plaintiff ~lelva R. Steele and 
the railroad eon1pany. the issue being a determination 
of' whether or not the railroad engineer gave a warning 
si~nal hy whistle or bell as he approached the crossing. 
(R. 7·~. Tr. I to 9}. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .APPEAL 
Both defendants seek affirmance of that part of 
the lower court's order granting summary judgment 
against plaintiff \Villimn H. Steele and Melva R. 
Steele. Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company further seeks reversal of the lower 
court's order refusing to grant that defendant's motion 
t'or summary judg1nent against Melva R. Steele. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to promote clarity, the parties will be 
referred to hereiu as plaintiffs and defendants. 
Defendant \Y eyher Construction Company was 
awarded a contract by the l_ ... tah State Road Commission 
to erect a concrete overpass to carry vehicle traffic over 
the railroad tracks of the defendant Denver & Rio 
Grande \, ... estern Railroad Company. The fill dirt at 
both ends of the overpass had been placed about two 
years prior to the construction of the concrete overpass 
and had been settling for this time. The fill dirt was 
not placed at the site of the overpass by ''r eyher Con-
struction. Its contract was only for the erection of the 
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concrete overpass connecting the elevated earth filled 
approaches to the tracks. (R. 62-63). On the morning 
of October 19, 1961, the plaintiffs were intending to go 
to a nursery east of the railroad tracks. They drove 
upon the old roadway leading to the fill and overpass 
that was being constructed. As they approached the 
beginning of the fill, each of them saw that the road 
had been barricaded with a fence and a sign was erected 
in the center of the road stating "road closed". (Plain-
tiffs' depositions, 9 to 11, 39). Plaintiffs further saw 
that men were working on the concrete overpass. It was 
a clear sunny· morninfg and visibility was good. (Plain-
tiffs' depositions 12, 40 and 41). They noted that there 
was an access way south of the fill running parallel with 
the fill to the railroad tracks. In spite of the sign stating 
that the road was closed, they drove around the fill 
dirt on the south, the fill running approximately east 
and west, and approached the railroad tracks. Mr. 
Steele admitted that there were no signs indicating that 
he should turn on to the access way or that this was a 
detour. (Plaintiffs' depositions 10 & 11). He ap-
proached the railroad tracks with the windows on his 
pickup truck rolled down. (Plaintiffs' deposition 12). 
There was a sign near the tracks stating that the area 
was private property and a railroad right of way, and 
that trespas~ing was at person's own risk. (Exhibits 2, 
3 & 4) . Just as Mr. Steele drove upon the tracks he 
looked up toward the top of the overpass where the 
men were working and made no observation for trains. 
(Plaintiffs' depositions 15 & 1_7). Mrs. Steele suddenly 
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exclaimed that they were directly in the path of the 
train whieh was just a matter of a few feet from their 
tru<.·k at that time. (Plaintiffs· depositions 14, 15, 41 
and -t:!). The diesel engine struck the plaintiffs' pickup 
truck awl carried it a short distance south of the point 
of impact before casting it off to the west of the tracks. 
Plaintiffs were thereafter removed to a hospital to be 
treated for their injuries. 
POIXTS l.H<-~ED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SC~L\L\.H\ .. JUDG~IENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF DEFEND-
.AXT\YE\THER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SU~L\L\HY JlTDG:\IENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF 'VILLIAl\I H. STEELE AND IN 
FA \ .. OR OF DEFENDANT DENVER & RIO 
(~IL\XDE \YESTERN RAILROAD. 
POINT III 
THE COlTRT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
PER:\IIT THE ...-\PPLICATIOX OF THE DOC-
TRIXE OF L.A.ST CLEAR CHANCE UNDER 
THE F~-\CTS OF THE CASE. 
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POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE DEFENDANT DENVER AND RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY 
AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF MELVA R. 
STEELE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF DEFEND, 
ANTWEYHER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
Mr. Setele testified in his deposition that as he ap-
proached the overpass he noted that the road ahead 
of him was barricaded and that there was a sign stating 
"road closed". (Plaintiffs' deposition pages 10 and 11, 
Appellant's brief, page 3). He then noted that about 
100 feet west of the barricade and this sign, there 
appeared to be a turnoff south of the road he was 
traveling and turning to the east going along the south 
side of the fill dirt. He proceeded to take this dirt 
access way driving at about 15 or 20 miles an hour. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, page 14). Just as he approached 
the railroad tracks, he looked up to the top of the over-
pass to watch the men working. While watching the 
men, he drove upon the railroad tracks. It was at this 
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moment that his wife shouted to hi1n to look and he 
then saw the on-cmning train and the accident occurred. 
(Plaintiff's <leposition 14 & 15). He admittedly did 
not stop before driving on to the tracks. He said he 
hadn't noticed the tracks as he was looking up at the 
men working on top of the overpass as he approached 
awl drove upon the track. He never looked to his left 
or to his right before driving upon the track. (Plaintiff's 
deposition, page 27). He admitted that had he stopped 
within 10 feet of the railroad track, he would have had 
visibility along the track in the direction from which 
the train approached. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 28) . 
In 1\Irs. Steele's deposition, she admits that there 
was a sign stating "road closed". (Plaintiff's deposition, 
page 39). After her husband had driven onto the access 
way leading to the tracks, she requested that he turn 
around and go back. (Plaintiff's deposition, page 39). 
\Vhen they reached the railroad track, the train was 
right upon them and the impact took place. Defendant's 
counsel asked her if she suggested to her husband that 
he stop before he got onto the track and she replied: 
.. ,yell. I thought he knew. He had always 
took precautions before." (Plaintiff's deposition 
Page 42). 
She admitted that before they got to the tracks she 
could see the tracks. 'Yhen asked why she wanted her 
husband to turn around and go back she answered: 
'''Yell, I guess the obstructed view ... you 
just couldn't see from the north ... I imagine 
that is the reason I said, 'Let's go back.' " 
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She was then asked: 
"I say, is that the reason you suggested you 
turn around, because you couldn't see to the 
north?" 
ANSWER: "I imagine it would. A woman 
always has an intuition. You can't tell why she 
has it or how she has it, it is just there." 
QUESTION: "You were concerned about a 
train maybe coming from the north?" 
ANSWER: "Couldn't hear one; I never heard 
no whistles or anything." 
QUESTION: "I say, is that the reason you 
suggested you turn around, because you couldn't 
see to the north?" 
ANSWER: "I imagine it would." (Plaintiff's 
deposition Pages 42 and 43). 
Mrs. Steele said that the train was coming under the 
viaduct as her husband drove upon the track. She was 
again asked in her deposition: 
"you saw the tracks before you got to them, I 
assume." 
ANSWER: "Yes." 
QUESTION: "And you knew the tracks 
were there, I assume." 
ANSWER: "Yes, I think that is why I sug-
gested, 'Bill, turn around and go back.' " (Plain-
tiff's deposition Page 51). 
The affidavit of Maurice Anderson, project engi-
neer for the State of Utah on the site in question, was 
filed wherein Mr. Anderson testified that the fill dirt 
10 
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constituting the approach to the overpass was placed 
in the area by a contractor other than defendant Weyher 
Construction Company and that the road had been 
closed pursuant to his order. A barricade in the form 
of a wire fence was placed across the roadway with a 
sign stating "ROAD CLOSED". (R. 62). Interroga-
tories were submitted to the plaintiffs wherein they were 
asked: 
"Did the driver of the truck, William H. 
Steele, look to his left and to his right before 
driving onto the railroad tracks?" 
ANSWER: "No". (R. 55). 
Plaintiffs state in their brief that they heard the 
train when they were about ten feet from the railroad 
tracks but "this warning came too late ... " (Appel-
lants' Brief, Page 3). They concede that the access 
way leading to the railroad tracks was a private way 
meant only for the use of the defendants. Both plain-
tiffs were trespassers. (Brief Page 4). The rights and 
duties of the parties should be measured accordingly. 
Plaintiffs make every effort to characterize the scene 
of the accident as a hidden or dangerous trap. Mrs. 
Steele admonished her husband to turn around and go 
back because of her fear of the very danger that existed. 
She admitted telling him to turn back because she 
thought a train might be coming and the view to the 
north was somewhat obstructed. (Plaintiff's deposition, 
Pages 42. 43 & 51). Her fears proved to be well found-
ed. The tracks were not hidden, nor were they danger-
ous if due care had been exercised. To the contrary, 
11 
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the danger if any, was open and obvious and was known 
to Mrs. Steele, who brought it to her husband's atten-
tion. (See photo Exhibits 1 to 4) . They try to excuse 
their negligence by claiming an obstructed view to the 
north created by the fill dirt constituting the approach 
to the overpass yet would burden the engineer operating 
the train with the duty of seeing through the fill and 
being aware of their unauthorized approach to the 
tracks. Plaintiffs admit that their view was obstructed 
until they were within ten feet of the tracks. They also 
admit that the truck in which they were riding did not 
stop as they approached the track but continued on to 
the tracks and the impact then occurred. It is self-
evident that if they could not see the train until they 
were close to the tracks, the engineer of the train was 
under the same disability until he was so close to the 
truck that he would have absolutely no opportunity 
or human ability to stop the train in time to avoid the 
collision. 
Plaintiffs further attempt to place themselves in 
the legal relationship of invitees or licensees. By their 
own admission they were driving upon a private access 
way and the signs had warned them that the road was 
closed. They became trespassers and the duty owed to 
them was the duty owed to any other trespasser. 
In their brief, plaintiffs cite several cases and text 
authorities in an effort to support their theory that 
certain duties a.nd obligations are owed to invitees. It 
is respectfully submitted that none of the texts cited 
12 
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or eases referred to apply to the instant situation. The 
citations refer to cases invoh·ing business invitees or 
persons coming upon the property by implied invitation 
for the benefit of the owner. Plaintiffs were trespassers 
and therefore the authorities cited by the plaintiffs do 
not apply. 
Plaintiff's fail to strengthen their position by these 
t·ontentions as the cases cited clearly show that before 
a given condition can be construed as being a trap, it 
must be shown that it could not be discovered by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. The testimony of Mrs. 
Steele clearly demonstrates that she was fully aware 
of the existence of the tracks and the possibility that 
a train might very well be approaching from the north. 
Had her husband, who was driving the pickup truck, 
exercised his own powers of observation, he too would 
ha,·e been aware of the tracks. He certainly cannot be 
heard to say that he did not or could not see what was 
clearly obYious and was there to be seen. 
Reasonable minds could not differ in concluding, 
as did the lower court, that the plaintiffs were trespassers 
upon the railroad tracks. ~Irs. Steele admittedly knew 
of the tracks and asked her husband to return to the 
highway for fear of the very accident that occurred. 
)lr. Steele, in proceeding to drive upon the railroad 
tracks without first looking for a train, was the sole 
cause of the accident. The defendant ''T eyher Construc-
tion Cmnpany did not owe to the plaintiffs any duty 
greater than it owed to any other trespasser. No breach 
of duty can be shown. 
13 
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POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF WILLIAM H. STEELE AND IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DENVER & RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD. 
For the reasons set forth in Point I, the court acted 
properly in granting judgment against plaintiff Wil-
liam H. Steele and in favor of the railroad. In the case 
of Abdulkadir vs. The Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 7 Utah 2nd 53, 318 P. 2nd 339, at page 56, this 
learned court said: 
"It is a rule universally recognized, and settled 
beyond question in this jurisdiction, that the 
duty of care requires one entering upon a rail-
road track to use every reasonable opportunity 
to look and listen for approaching trains and to 
exercise caution to avoid being struck. Where 
the physical facts and circumstances are such 
that he could, by looking or listening, have seen 
or heard the approach of the train, he cannot be 
heard to say that he looked and listened, yet 
did not see or hear it. Under such circumstances 
it is but natural to presume that the traveler 
either did not look or listen_, or that he failed to 
heed what he perceived_, and such conduct 'Will 
generally impute contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. Plaintiff does not disagree with 
the above rule but seeks to bring this case with-
in those exceptions where there are obstructions, 
distractions, or other extenuating circumstances 
which may obstruct the traveler's view, or engage 
his attention, or lead him to rely on safety, or 
14 
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otherwise tend to prevent or excuse him from dis-
covering an approaching train." (Italics ours}. 
This l'ourt in l'onsidt·ring the defense set forth by the 
plaintiff therein to excuse his actions further said: 
"Even if the light on the train might have been 
confused with lights on the highway at some dis-
tance, as close as the train must necessarily 
have been to these travelers when they stopped 
upon the tracks, it obviously would have been 
distinguishable had they looked. If we assume, 
as plaintiff suggests, that there was no light on 
the train until the instant before impact, such 
an object as a train_~oming to.ward them on the 
tracks would certainly not be invisible, nor 
noiseless. The testimony that even though they 
'lccre observing for trains they neither saw nor 
heard one is too incredible to be accepted and 
comes squarely within the rule that one cannot 
be heard to say that he looked and listened_, yet 
did Mt see or hear ~_hat was there plainly to be 
observed."'"' (Italics ours) . 
The instant case is one in which the facts clearly show 
that ~lr. and 1\Irs. Steele cannot be heard to say that 
they looked and listened yet did not see or hear what 
was plainly there to be observed. 
In the case of Gregory vs. Denver & Rio Grande 
\Vestern Railroad Company, 8 Ut. 2nd 114, 329 P. 2nd 
407, wherein the plaintiff's husband drove upon a cross-
ing of several railroad tracks and, not observing a watch-
man or flagman that he said was usually there, con-
tinued to drive across the tracks and was struck before 
clearing all of the tracks, this court said at page 117: 
15 
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"The plaintiff's own witness testified that from 
the point where the driver of plaintiff's automo-
bile entered the crossing, the track upon which 
the collision occurred was visible for a distance 
of one-quarter to one-half mile to the north." 
The court then affirmed the trial court's granting of a 
directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice Crockett stated: 
"There was no reason why he could not have 
seen the train which was coming from the north. 
Under the old and well established rule, this 
impails him upon the horns of a dilemma. He 
either failed to look or he looked and failed to 
heed." 
In the same case and in a separate concurring opinion, 
Mr. Justice Wade further said: 
"I concur with the result because I think the 
failure of the driver of the automobile to look to 
see if a train was coming 'W{l8 the sole proximate 
cause of the accident.-'-' (Italics ours). 
In our instant case, the evidence clearly shows that 
the fill dirt placed in the area was not placed there by 
the railroad and it certainly should not be charged with 
creating a hazardous condition over which it had no 
control. 
In the case of Benson vs. The Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, 4 Ut. 2nd 38, 238, P. 
2nd 790, this court stated: 
"In both these cases the confusing situation 
creating a hazard was caused by the railroad 
company rather than by outside agents. The 
16 
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plaintiff' has not cited an.IJ cases in which the 
court has luld contributory negligence to be out-
aide the ycncral rule 'lehcn the hazard affecting 
vi.vihility 'll'as not ceused or at least partially 
cuuscd hy the railroad company itself. 
"l~'1•cn if the railroad company is the cause of 
the hazard, the travelers are not absolved from 
the dcyrce of care required of ordinary~ reason-
able and prudent men. The court in the Pippy 
case, supra, at Page 451 of 79 Utah, at Page 310 
of 11 P. 2wl said: 'the conflict however, does 
not go to the proposition that under complicated 
conditions the traveler is relieved from looking 
and listening for the approach of trains, or from 
exercising due care and vigilance to avoid injury. 
That is his duty at all times and on all occasions 
in approaching a railroad erasing and in driving 
over it, •whether the view is obstructed or un-
obstructed~ and the greater the hazard or danger 
surrounding him~ the greater is the care required 
of him.n (Italics ours). 
It is clear from the record that the sole cause of 
the plaintiffs' injuries was the failure of Mr. Steele 
to take proper precautions before driving upon the rail-
road tracks. Had he looked he surely would have seen 
the approachig train. The exhibits demonstrate, and 
the plaintiffs ad1nit, that there was an opportunity for 
them to haYe seen the train before driving upon the 
tracks. )Irs. Steele did not suggest that Mr. Steele 
stop before he got to the tracks as she said: 
"\Yell, I thought he knew. He had always 
took precautions before." (Plaintiff's deposi-
tion, Page 42) . 
17 
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Accordingly, we respectfully repeat that the lower 
court properly granted a summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road and against the plaintiff William H. Steele, and 
its judgment should be affirmed in that respect. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
PERMIT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOC-
TRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
Counsel for plaintiff William H. Steele argues in 
Point II of his brief that the Doctrine of Last Chance 
operated to give this plaintiff an opportunity to carry 
his care to a jury. The facts are clear. The testimony 
of both the plaintiffs demonstrates that at the time they 
drove upon the railroad tracks the locomotive was in 
immediate and close proximity to them and it was just 
a matter of seconds before the impact occurred. Their 
depositions show that when their automobile was driven 
into a position of peril on the tracks, it would have been 
impossible for the locomotive to stop to avoid the col-
lision. 
The case of Lawrence vs. Hamburger Railroad 
Company, 3 Ut. 2nd 247, 282 P. 2nd 335, and cited by 
the plaintiffs, points out the problem of stopping a train 
when the court stated: 
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"The motorman or engineer operating a train 
may assume, and act in reliance on the assump-
tion that a person on or approaching a crossing is 
in possession of his natural faculties and aware of 
the situation, including the fact that a train 
is a large and cumbersome instrumentality which 
is difficult to stop, and that the person will 
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable pre-
cautions for his own safety." 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs by their own 
testimony readily admit that the fill dirt constituting 
the approach to the overpass completely blocked any 
view they had to the north, the direction from which the 
train was coming. If they couldn't see, obviously, the 
engineer was under the same disability. 
Counsel then cites the Lawrence case, supra, as 
holding that when someone approaching a track is under 
a disability the railroad engineer has a greater duty to 
exercise due care. Counsel misapplies this court's hold-
ing in that case. It seems cle~r from the court's opinion 
that the disability being referred to was that of someone 
with an obvious limitation or disability such as children, 
blind persons, persons in perhaps wheelchairs or walking 
with crutches. or obviously very aged, etc. 
In the case of Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Ut. 2nd 25, 
361 P. 2nd 516, this learned court in discussing the doc-
trine of last chance, said: 
"However, the doctrine of last clear chance 
contemplates a last clear chance, not a last pos-
sible chance. The doctrine implies thought, 
appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of 
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sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse 
to save another from injury." 
In the case of Fox vs. Taylor, 10 Ut. 2nd 17 4, 350 
P. 2nd 154, this court stated: 
'"'"Where the defendant does not actually lcnow 
of the plaintiff, s situation of peril, the doctrine 
can only properly be applied where the plaintiff 
has gotten into a position of inextricable peril. 
An illustration of this is where a person has 
caught his foot in a railroad switch, or is in some 
other similar predicament, so that he is there-
after unable to avert the injury. In such a situ-
ation, the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest. 
In such circumstances the defendant may be held 
responsible. if he either knows, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care should know, of the plaintiff's 
helpless situation in #me to avoid the injury and 
fails to do so.,, (Italics ours). 
This court then pointed out that where a pedestrian 
walked into the path of an oncoming car, the doctrine 
of last clear chance would not apply. The court further 
said: 
"She was either in inextricable peril or she 
was not. If she was not in inextricable peril, 
then at any instant up to the time she got into 
such predicament, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, she could have observed the oncoming car 
and have avoided being hit. On the other hand, 
she could only have gotten into inextricable 
peril by getting into the path of the defendant's 
car, and her peril could be considered inextri-
cable only if the defendant was then too close 
to avoid striking her. Thus, by the very descrip-
tion of the situatiion, he did not have the 'last 
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clear chance' to avoid the injury. As the phrase 
indicates, it 1nust be a fair and clear opportunity 
aud not a mere possibility that the collision could 
lun·c been a'l.'oided. It is our conclusion that the 
trial court was correct in refusing to submit the 
case upon the doctrine of last clear chance." 
(Italics ours) . 
The facts in the instant case, as testified to by the plain-
tiffs, clearly show that the defendant's locomotive was 
so close to the plaintiffs at the time they drove upon 
the tracks, that the engineer had no possible opportu-
nity of avoiding the collision. The doctrine of last 
cleur chance therefore does not apply and we respect-
fully submit has no application under this factual 
situation. 
POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL 
THE COlTRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
t~IL\XT st:~r~LARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE DENYER & RIO GRANDE WEST-
EHX RAILROAD COl\tiP ANY AND AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF l\IEL Y A R. STEELE ON THE 
ISSI'"E OF THIS DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO 
SOCXD .A. 'YARNING SIGNAL OR HORN. 
As has been previously said, the access way that 
the plaintiffs were driving upon was a private way, 
hy their own admission in their brief at page 4. The 
duty of the railroad engineer to sound his horn could 
only arise at a time when he knew or should have known 
that the plaintiffs were entering upon or about to enter 
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upon the railroad tracks. The plaintiffs were trespassers 
and the railroad engineer owed no duty to them under 
this factual situation. This was not a railroad crossing. 
By their testimony they admit that neither could see 
each other until they were a matter of 10 feet from 
the tracks. (Plaintiff's deposition, Page 28). They 
were driving about 10 or 15 miles per hour. The train 
was approaching at such close proximity that the impact 
occurred in a matter of a second or two after they drove 
upon the tracks. The engineer could only have been 
aware of the approaching truck when it reached a point 
approximately 10 feet from the tracks. At this time, 
the plaintiffs were not in a position of inextricable peril 
but could have stopped before driving upon the tracks 
unless they were driving too fast for existing condi-
tions. As they continued to approach and drive upon the 
tracks, the engineer of the train was then so close that 
he could not avoid the impact as it occurred almost the 
instant they drove upon the tracks. (Plaintiffs' depo-
sitions, Pages 14, 15, 41 and 42). 
On Page 3 of the appellants' brief, they say: 
"The first warning the plaintiffs had that they 
were in danger was at a point about 10 feet from 
the railroad tracks when they heard a noise and 
looked up and saw the train about to strike their 
pickup. This warning came too late and the train 
collided with the pickup . . . " 
By their admissions they heard a warning before driving 
upon the tracks. It was not the warning that came too 
late but the inattentiveness of the plaintiffs that caused 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the accident. Their own negligence in failing to drive 
more slowly and to keep a reasonable lookout for the 
train before entering upon the tracks was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision. 
\ V e respectfully submit that the lower court should 
have granted defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company's motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is our position that the lower 
court properly granted summary judgment with respect 
to the n1atters set forth in respondent's Points I, II, 
and Ill, and that the same should be affirmed. We feel 
the lower court erred in refusing to grant a summary 
judgment on the issue of the sounding of a warning by 
the defendant railroad company and its ruling should 
be reversed and summary judgment entered, as a matter 
of law, in favor of the defendant Denver & Rio Grande 
\Vestern Railroad Company and against the plaintiff 
Melva R. Steele. 
Plaintiffs have cited several cases in their brief 
which have not been referred to by defendants as they 
are not in point with the questions involved on this 
appeal. Reference thereto would necessarily enlarge 
the defendant's brief and unnecessarily burden this 
court. 
It is further respectfully submitted by the defend-
ants that plaintiffs' brief is silent as to any reference 
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to the record in support of plaintiffs' statements. In 
answering plaintiffs' brief, defendants have made refer-
ences to the record on the points raised by the plaintiffs 
which should properly draw the court's attention to the 
Issues. 
This court has clearly stated its position as to when 
summary judgment should be granted by saying: 
"We are in accord with the idea that the right 
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe-
guarded. This, of course, does not go so far as 
to require the submission to a jury of issues of 
fact m~rely because they are disputed. If they 
would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff 
could recover, no m~t.ter how they were resolved, 
it would be useless ~~ consume time, effort and 
expense in trying them, the saving of which is 
the very purpose of summary judgment pro-
cedure." 
See Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, supra, at Page 55. 
In conclusion, may we quote this court's findings in 
the Benson case, supra, which we deem applicable in 
our instant case, wherein this court said at Page 44: 
"We believe that all reasonable men would 
agree that if plaintiff had looked, he could have 
seen the approaching train in time to stop and 
avoid the collision, unless he was traveling too 
fast under the existing conditions to do so.n 
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Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE and 
\VALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of 
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents and 
Cross-Appellant 
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